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INTRODUCTION
Background
Providing credit and organizational support to the poor who do not
have assets to use as collateral required by formal financial
institutions have been the key elements of the non-government
organization's (NGO) approach to alleviation of poverty and improving
livelihood in many developing countries. Although governments realize
that resource-poor rural households need affordable credit to enhance
household incomes, the formal financial institutions fail to reach the
poor because they adhere to stringent collateral requirements, and
the credit disbursement and recovery procedures are not suitable for
their economic environment (Baker 1968; Adams and Vogel 1986).
The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has developed a successful
model of extending credit to resource_poor households that are
generally bypassed by government financial institutions (Hossain
1988; Khandaker 1996). The model is now being replicated in a large
number of countries. The fundamental features of the Grameen Bank
model are (Fuglesang and Chandler 1988,1993):
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• An organizational structure that ensures that clients
belong to the bottom half of the socioeconomic hierarchy.
• A credit system that is designed to be simple and
adaptable to cater to the needs of clients.
• A built-in savings mobilization component that enhances
self-reliance and provides cover against business risks and
natural calamities.
• A self-empowerment mechanism that provides women an
opportunity to assert themselves in their households and
in society.
The Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD), a non-
government organization has been implementing a replication of the
Grameen Bank model in the Philippines, known as the Landless
People's Development Fund (LPDF). CARD was organized in
December 1986, with its headquarters situated in San Pablo City,
Laguna in Southern Luzon.
The scope of the study
The main objective of the LPDF.is to extend credit facilities to
resource-poor households to create opportunities for productive self-
employment for the vast underutilized human resource. The credit
program is thus targeted to the poor for improvement of their living
conditions. So, any evaluation study must investigate the extent to
which the credit has reached the target group, and analyze the impact
of credit on employment generation and improvement in the level of
living of the borrower household.
The economic viability of the credit program from the borrowers"
side depends on the rate of return of the activities that CARD
members are financing with the loan. If the rate of return of capital is
not high enough to cover the cost of the loan plus a premium for the
risk borne in undertaking the activities, the client may not continue
association with CARD and take a repeat loan, even if credit is
offered to them. So it would be useful to estimate the labor
productivity and profitability of the major enterprises that are
financed with the loan. The rate of return on investment may also
be used as a criterion for selecting enterprises that have potential
for growth and of judging the absorptive capacity of the member-
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From the lender's side, the economic viability of the credit
p[ogram depends on the capacity to recover the cost of operation
from the interest earnings. As the clientele come from a very poor
economic background, the size of the loan is typically small, and
repayments are collected in weekly installments. In addition, the
Grameen Bank model follows a program of intensive training for staff
and clientele for ensuring credit discipline and promoting a social
development program. All this means that the paper work and the
personnel needed for servicing a given amount of loan would be
substantially higher for this model of credit than under normal credit
programs. So the study should analyze the cost of operation of bank
branches, relate to size of business and age of the bank, estimate the
start-up cost and time required to be self-sufficient. This information
may be useful to study the financial viability and the scope of
expansion of the credit program.
This evaluation will mainly address the issues raised above.
Sources of data
The study utilizes secondary data on financial operations provided
by CARD as well as primary data collected by the authors through a
survey of randomly selected borrower households.
In the absence of benchmark information on economic conditions
of the borrowers, we decided to assess the economic impact by
comparing situations of old and new borrowers. The study required
that the sample have representations of different age of membership
with CARD and the number of Loans tak'en. For geographical
representation we considered the intensity of poverty for selecting
the branches from which to draw the sample respondents, since the
objective of the credit program is to improve the livelihood of low-
income households. Considering these two factors, we selected the
provinces of Masbate and Laguna for generating primary information
for borrowers. Laguna represents old branches and the economically
better-off area, and Masbate represents new branches and the
economically depressed area. In Laguna, four centers from San Pablo
and Bay branches were selected to represent different ages of the
centers. In the Masbate area an old center was selected from the
Masbate branch and a new center, from the Milagros branch. Thus,
the primary data were generated from 133 member households
belonging to six centers and four branch offices of CARD. Table 1278 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Table 1. Age of membershipand loanstaken for sample respondents:
by branch.
: No. of Yeari_f establishi"g ::No, of years: ::No; of
Branches members , thebranch :: of membership::i: loans ;
", ,,....... , , , ,',: ., , , ,,, __.
SanPablo(old) 29 Jan. 1990 7.1 4.1
Bay (old) 35 June 1990 6,3 3.6
Masbate (old) 39 April 1991 4.3 3.1
Milagros (new) 30 June 1995 2.5 2.0
Source:IRRIfieldsurvey.
shows that sample households do represent different ages of
membership with CARD and the cross-section of borrowers classified
by the number of loans taken.
The survey was conducted from February to April 1997. The data
was collected by interviewing respondents with a structured
questionnaire finalized after a pre-testing in the Bay area. Itcontains
information on credit history of borrowers, their socioeconomic
background, asset holding, costs and returns on enterprises financed
with the loan, employment and incomes generated from CARD-
financed and other economic activities of the household.
ORGANIZATION AND PROGRESS OF THE LPDF PROJECT
Background to the Project
The CARD started its operation in April 1988 with a training-
focused community and livelihood assistance program for landless
coconut workers (CARD 1995). It organized them into associations of
more than 15 members each, assisted them in formulating systems
and procedures for savings and capital build-up schemes, and
provided loans based on the outcome of its project management
training. It undertook other development activities in coordination
with various agencies. These included installing deep tubewell pumps,
organizing credit and multi-purpose cooperatives, and experimenting
with demonstration farms for extending improved agricultural
technologies to small farmers, marginal fishermen and landless
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The initial results on credit operation was not encouraging.
Members were not able to repay the loan in time and mobilization of
savings was marginal to have any meaningful impact on the life of the
members. Recognizing the weakness of the traditional scheme, CARD
decided to test on a pilot basis a modified Grameen Bank model in four
villages in San Pablo. Management staff and technical officers were
sent for training to Grameen Bank in Bangladesh to familiarize
themselves with the essential features of the Grameen. Encouraged
by the successful outcome of the pilot scheme, CARD launched in
January !990 the LPDF project, adopting the essential features of
Grameen, and modifying some to suit the unique lifestyle and
economic conditions of the Filipino landless poor. Within April 1993 it
set up five branches in Laguna, Quezon, Marinduque and Masbate
provinces.
Organization
The following elements of the Grameen Bank model has been
taken up by CARD:
• Targeting women from the low-income households as
clientele.
• Taking the bank services to the village in place of the
normal practice of asking people to come to the bank to
avail of the credit facilities.
• Organizing the prospective borrowers into groups of 5
like-minded persons with a number of Groups (5 to 8)
being federated into a Center. The Center holds a fixed
weekly meeting attended by the Field Staff of the Bank to
conduct credit business.
• Group solidarity and peer pressure are used to oversee
proper utilization of credit; which are used as the
substitute for the collateral taken in normal credit
programs. Group members take responsibility for repaying
the loan of a defaulting member. Members are given
training to ensure strict credit discipline.
• Credit is given in small sizes with progressively higher
amounts for repeat loans as members gain confidence in
utilizing the previous loan. The loan is repaid within a year,
in weekly installments of two percent of the loan amount,280 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
so that the repayment does not constitute a burden on the
economic condition of the borrowing household.
• Developing collective funds with compulsory weekly
savings of the members and five percent of the loan
amount deducted upfront, for mutual benefits of the
members.
• Using credit as an entry point for social development
promoted by the institution among members with active
involvement of the field staff.
The major differences with the Grameen model are in selecting
the target group, organization of the training program, and operation
of the collective funds. CARD provides more intensive training on
project management and credit discipline to the prospective
borrowers than the Grameen Bank does. In Bangladesh Grameen Bank
uses the ownership of land (up to 0.2 ha) as the main criterion for
selecting the target group. CARD identifies its target group on the
basis of housing and marketable assets (up to P25,000) determined
on the basis of means tests on prospective members. In Grameen the
collective funds is managed by the Group while in CARD it is managed
by the Center. A mutual fund is developed to provide insurance against
accidents, limited old age pensions and supporting burial expenses.
Progress of operations
The cumulative achievement of LPDF is shown in Tables 2 & 3. By
end of March 1997, CARD has organized 9968 members into 259
Centers under 13 branches. It now serves 7324 active members, as
22% of the members initially recognized have dropped out over time
(Table 3). The loans disbursed have reached P82.3 million of which
P62.4 million have already been recovered. The loan outstanding with
the borrowers have reached P1.94 million. The savings accumulated
in the Center Fund have grown to 11.05 million which is about 55%
of the loans outstanding with the borrowers.
Although CARD started the Grameen replication in 1990 most of
the expansion took place over the last three years after it was able to
receive a sizeable soft loan from the Grameen Trust in August 1993.
By the end of 1993 it mobilized only about 1711 active members into
97 Centers through six branches. The number of outstanding loans
with the members increased from P2.3 million in 1993 to 19.9 millionHOSSAIN and DIAZ: REACHING THE POOR WITH MICROCREDIT 281
Table 2. Cumulative achievement of LPDF up to March, 1997.
Up to March Up to December
1997 1993
No. of branches under operation 13 6
No. of centers organized 259 97
No. of groups formed 1,654 386
No. of recognized members 9,968 2,214
No. of active members 7,324 1,711
Total loans disbursed (000 P) 82,266 9,076
Total loans recovered 62,394 6,815
Amount of outstanding loan 19,872 2,261
Accumulated center fund 11,048 463
Source: CARD.
Table 3. Progress in the operation's of LPDF, 1990-96.
i Accumulated_cutnulated No.of No.of Dropout
;_'" 'i ,l_a'ns lnans Members' center members active rate
disbursedoutstanding savings I 'fund rscognized members (%)
(000 Peso) i
1990 1021 506 16 108 350 307 12.3
1991 lO77 577 38 229 279 161 42.3
1992 2905 15o9 127 507 598 481 19.6
1993 4073 2261 292 970 987 762 22.8
1994 11163 6128 781 2477 2297 1836 20.0
1995 16930 9626 1401 4982 1482 693 53.3
1996 35913 19421 2372 8715 3275 2604 20.0
Source: CARD, 1997.
by the end of March 1997. Four of the old branches now disburse
over six million pesos a year to over 800 active members, with five
field staff per branch.
Size and type of loan
Table 4 shows the distribution of borrowers by the number of
loans taken and the expansion of the average size of loan with282 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
successive repeat loans, as estimated from the survey. Nearly 25% of
the borrowers have already taken five or more loans with an average
size of loan of more than P15,000. The first two loans are typically
small, because the institution does not want to take risks with new
and inexperienced borrowers. The small size of loan also allow new
members to gather confidence in handling credit and explore markets.
The size of loan grows fast after two years, as the members could
also access loans for housing improvement.
Table 4. Distribution of respondents and loans by number of loans taken.
,,' ,,' ,':' '""" .... "'i', :' ,, ,,' ' ' :" "' ' ' ':
No,of n" .... :ResPo dents : Ave. size ,', ,,
;,, , ,,, , .... :
loans taken' : ;: N0, : ::i:: :: Percent of loan
Nil 1 0.01 0
One 21 15.8 2157
Two 28 21.1 4368
Three 26 19.6 8612
Four 23 17.3 10543
Five 27 20.3 17567
Six 6 4.5 17167
Seven 1 0.01 37000
Total 133 100.0 9386
Source: IRRIFieldSurvey.
Table 5 provides information on the distribution of current loans
by the type of loans. The financial loan is the credit line that is used
for undertaking economic enterprises and earns income. But members
also take out loans for housing improvement, financing educational
cost, tiding over financial crisis due to natural disasters and health-
related emergencies, improving household conditions, etc. These
loans have to be paid in weekly installments and bear the same rate of
interest as the financial loan. The financial loan accounts for only
53% of the total loan, and hence the rate of return from investment
on the credit-financed enterprises has to be substantially higher than
the rate of interest in order to have the capacity to repay other loans.
Otherwise, the borrower would have to draw on the income of other
members. Emergency loans are taken out mainly by new borrowersHOSSAIN and DIAZ: REACHING THE POOR WITH MICROCREDIT 283
who find it difficult to cope financially. As the income generated from
successive loans improves the economic capacity of households, the
need for emergency loans is reduced substantially. Older borrowers,
however, draw on available housing loans in large sizes.
Table 5. Distribution of current loans by type and age of membership.
No_ of,loans Financial Housil_g , Educational Emergency Total
: : _t_tak_ _loan loanI : loan i loan loan
Up to two 1640 840 202 670 3352
(48.9) (25.1) (6.0) (20.0) (100.0)
Three to four 4449 3776 447 847 9513
(46.8) (39.7) (4.7) (8.9) (100.0)
Five & more 10500 5735 435 1398 18068
(58.1) (31.7) (2.4) (7.7) (100.0)
Total 4940 3173 352 921 9386
(52.6) (33.9) (3.8) (9.8) (100.0)
Note: Figureswithin parentheses arc perc_nt oftotaLIoans.
Source: IRRIFieldSurvey.
SUCCESS IN REACHING THE POOR WITH CREDIT
The Grameen regards credit as a key development input and
access to credit as a basic human right (Yunus 1986, 1995). It
attempts to empower the poor by providing them collateral-free loans
to organize economic enterprises. The success of the Grameen was in
developing an appropriate credit delivery mechanism to reach the
bottom 50% of the household in the socioeconomic ladder. Any
evaluation of the micro-credit program should therefore first assess
the extent to which the target group has been reached.
The Grameen Bank defines the target group as households
owning less than 0.20 ha of land, who constitute the bottom 50% of
the rural households in Bangladesh (Hossain 1988). Table 6 provides
information obtained from the survey of the borrowers regarding their
distribution with respect to landholding and the share of credit284 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
received by various group. It will be seen that 70% of the CARD
members are completely landless and they received 63% of the
financial loans and 73% of the housing loan provided by CARD. Only
24% of CARD members have landholdings of over 0.2 ha, and 9%
above one hectare. In many target group-oriented programs, the
economically well-off out-of-target members influence the
management of the program to have a proportionately much larger
share of the resources available under the program. In CARD, the off-
target group households according to the Gr'ameen standard,
however, could not monopolize the credit; their share of loans was
proportional to their numbers.
CARD defines its target group with respect to the value of the
house and marketable assets. Only households who have assets not
exceeding P25,000 are eligible to become members of CARD.
Table 6. Distribution of borrowers and loans by size of landholding.
.i. .' . i.,:'= " .' i: ' ',"':':': "
Landholding PercentOf::: Share of : Share of : , , , , :, ,, ,,, ,
groups (ha) borrowers:: i financialloan housingloan
,::: , , ,':, ,,, ,,
Nil 69.9 63,9 72.8
Up to 0,20 4.5 4,5 2.4
0,21-0,50 12.0 18,0 15.5
0.51-1.00 4.5 3.5 4.3
1.00 & above 9.0 9.7 5.0
100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:IRRI fieldsurvey.
Table 7 provides information on the distribution of CARD
members with respect to the value of housing and their financial and
housing loans. Only 29% of households reported a value of housing
over P25,000 and they had a share of 34% of financial loans and 39%
of housing loans. It thus appears that a sizeable proportion of CARD
loans go to households who are not eligible to be the members of the
institution. It is not clear however whether member-households have
invested in housing after becoming members of CARD which
contributed to the accumulation of value above the eligibility limit.
This possibility cannot be ruled out since CARD also provide loans for
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Table 7. Distribution of borrowers and loans by value of housing.
Value of housing Percent of Share of Share of
(000 P) borrowers financial loan housing loan
Up to 2.0 15.0 22.9 21.3
2.01-5.0 11.3 7,2 4.3
5.01 =I0.0 18.8 19.6 13.0
10.01-25.0 25.6 16,1 22.0
25.01 _50.0 21.9 24,2 28.7
50,01 & above 7.5 9.9 10,7
Source: IRRIfield survey.
An important factor that would affect the income earning
capacity of the individual is the level of education. Table 8 provides
information obtained from the survey on the distribution of the CARD
members with respect to the completed year of schooling. About
42% of the members have only primary level education, and these
'human resource' poor households had a share of 33% of financial
loans, and 40% of the housing loan. At the other end, 13% of
members had college level education. These members should have
better opportunities of finding a job in the market and higher
opportunity cost of using labor in CARD financed activities. They
tapped 17% of the financial loans, and 21% of housing loans, which
is proportionately much higher than their numbers,
Table 8, Distribution of borrowers and loans by educational status of the
member.
1
Educational status Percent of Share of Share of '
(No. of years in schooling) borrowers financial loans housing loan
Up to 3 7.5 2.4 7.1
4-6 34,5 31.0 33.4
7-10 45.1 49.5 38.2
11-14 12.8 17,0 21.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: IRRlfield survey.286 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
It appears from the above evidence that CARD has not been
100% successful in limiting the credit services to the extreme poor.
This might have resulted from the difficulty of assessing the
economic situation of the household through the means test.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY AT THE BORROWER LEVEL
Cost of credit
The cost of loan is fairly high in Grameen type microcredit
program because of the high cost of operation arising from the highly
intensive supervision required for its success. CARD charges 20%
rate of interest per annum on the amount of loans disbursed and
deducts upfront 4% of the loan amount as a service fee. Since the
principal is repaid in 50 weekly installments starting immediately after
the disbursement of the loan, the amount of outstanding loan with the
borrower is less than half of the amount disbursed. Thus, the
effective rate of interest comes to about 44% of the amount available
for investment by the borrower (outstanding loan). The creditwill
contribute to increasing income of the borrowing household only if the
rate of return on capital in the enterprise financed with CARD credit is
higher than this effective rate of interest (Baker 1968). To assess the
financial viability of the credit program at the member level, it is
therefore necessary to estimate the rate of return on investment in
enterprises financed with the loan,
Repayment of loan
The rate of recovery of credit and the demand for repeat !oans are
indirect indicators of the financial viability at the borrower level. If the
member incurs losses in the business enterprise, she would not have
the capacity to repay the loan. If she had been forced to repay the
loan from incomes of other household enterprises, she would not
demand a repeat loan and would drop out from the organization,
unless she finds other benefits in the organization. The CARD reports
an average drop-out rate of 23% (Table 3) but this occurs mostly in
the first year after the members are recognized. The drop-out rate
was unusually high in Marinduque branch, moderate in Masbate,
Mindoro and Palanas branch and fairly low in San Pablo, Bay, Dolores288 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
labor time to these various activities. Collection of information on
time allocation needs weekly surveys throughout the year, which is
costly and time consuming. The problem is compounded by the fact
that a household would often have more than one working member
who may be engaged in different activities and helping each other in
their work. The second problem is to identify actual investment on the
activity when the household is engaged in multi-enterprises. Money is
fungible. The full amount of loan may not be used for the activity for
wi_ich the loan is taken. It is very likely that household members
would pool the available resources (from whatever source they are
obtained) for operating them on the household basis.
The activities financed by micro-credit are run mostly with family
labor. We need to deduct the cost of family labor from household
income to estimate 'profits' and the rate of return on capital. An
important conceptual problem here is how to impute the cost of
family labor. Since labor market hardly exists for most of these
activities, it is difficult to get information on the wage rate that could
be used to impute the opportunity cost of family labor. Even if it is
available, it may not approximate the opportunity cost, as the family
labor utilized in these activities might not get equal employment at
that wage in alternative occupations. The wage rate would have been
depressed if the labor market had to absorb all the surplus labor
available in the locality.
In view of the above problems the findings on rates of return
reported below have to be interpreted carefully.
Methodology
We collected information from respondents on the number of
months different household members worked for CARD financed and
other economic activities, the number of days employed in a month,
and the average number of hours employed in a day, which was the
basis for estimating standard eight-hour days of labor used in the
enterprises. The respondents also reported average weekly income
accruing to the household from CARD financed and other economic
activities, which was blown up (multiplied by 52) to get yearly
income. The income from land and livestock holding was estimated
from input data collected on a seasonal basis.
Three alternative measures of the return from investment has
been estimated, (a) net household income, I, (b) net income per unit ofHOSSAIN and DIAZ." REACHING THE POOR WITH MICROCREDIT 289
labor, i.e., labor productivity, RL,and (c) rate of return on capital, Rk.
These have been estimated as follows:
I = Y-rk-L (1)
RL = I/N (2)
Rk = (Y - wN)/K (3)
where
Y = annual gross household income from the activity.
N = number of standard eight-hour days of employment
in the activity for all household members.
L = the amount of financial loan obtained from CARD.
K = own and borrowed capital used in the enterprise.
r = the rate of interest on the loan (40% per year).
w = wage rate or the opportunity cost of labor (PS0 per day).
The net income of the household would be the most appropriate
measure of the return on micro-credit if the labor employed in the
activity would have remained idle in the absence of access to credit.
At the other end, (I-WN) is the most appropriate measure of net
income, if all the labor employed in the micro-credit financed
enterprises could be alternatively employed in agriculture or other
economic activities at the market wage rate. The actual position
regarding the operation of informal enterprise depends on the
economic situation in the locality. For this reason, we have estimated
the net return per labor to eliminate a comparison with the
opportunity cost of labor that would determine the desirability of the
investment.
The rate of return on capital would have been the most
appropriate indicator for the viability of investment with micro-credit
when the entrepreneur runs the activity with hired labor (a capitalist
enterprise). If the rate of return were higher than the cost of
investment (the rate of interest plus a risk premium), it would be
profitable to make that investment. But the target group for micro-
credit runs the activities mostly with family labor that faces
inadequate and uncertain employment opportunities in the market.
Hence, the rate of return on capital should not be used as an
appropriate guide for the borrowers' investment decision and the
latent demand for credit. Also, since the amount of investment is very
small, Rk would be highly sensitive to the assumption of wage rate
and the error of measurement on employment of labor, for which
accurate information is difficult to collect.290 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Results and discussions
The estimates of the returns from microcredit for the sample
respondents, as well as for different branches are reported in Table
10. It will be seen that nearly 97% of the financial loan has been
reportedly invested in the enterprise, which generated 163 days of
employment during a year for the CARD member, and another 84
days for other members of the households, generating a yearly gross
income of P34,550 (P2,879 per month). The contribution of the
credit-financed activity to net household income is estimated at
P26,884 per annum. The labor productivity is P109 per day, about
36% higher than the wage rate prevailing in the market. The rate of
return on investment is estimated at 117%, which is substantially
higher than the effective rate of interest (46%) charged by CARD on
the loan outstanding with the member. Thus, the enterprise financed
with micro-credit is highly financially viable whatever indicator we
use.
The rate of return varies significantly across the branches under
study (Table 10). The return is the lowest for the center in the
Milagros branch in Masbate. The labor productivity estimated for this
branch is lower than the wage rate and the rate of return on capital is
negative. But the activity adds P15,803 to the household income.
Milagros is a new branch, and as such the amount of financial loan
and the capital employed in the enterprise is small. This is a highly
poverty stricken area and the CARD members have very little
employment opportunities in the labor market in the locality. Inspite of
the low return, the members value the CARD credit highly, because it
helps them increase household income by reducing underemployment
of family workers. During the course of our investigation we found
the members of this center highly motivated and interested in
participating in the credit program.
The rate of return is found to be the highest for the center studied
for the Masbate branch (Table 10). The size of financial loan is the
highest for the center, and the borrowers have put up a large amount
of their own fund in the enterprises financed with CARD credit. An
average enterprise generated 249 days of employment for the
borrower, and another 91 days of employment for the husband and/or
other family members, and contributed P46,000 additional income for
the household. The labor productivity is almost 68% higher than the
wage rate and the rate of return of capital is 210%. Obviously theHOSSAIN and DIAZ: REACHING THE POOR WITH MICROCREDIT 291
Table 10, Rate of return on labor and capital: by branch.
' ' ' ' t
,'Items,,' : , San_:Pab!o, ,! _/, Masbate Milagros !TQt_,,, i_: :':',,,!i::' ,, : ' , , _ ,, .... _, • " '",
(No, of cases) (29) (35) (39) (30) (133)
Gross income
(P/annum) 34,766 23,454 55,060 20,644 34,550
Total capital (P) 6,776 6703 8983 4227 6814
Equity 879 2646 2985 1127 2017
Loan 5,897 4,057 5,948 3,100 4797
Financial loan (P) 5414 5143 5782 3150 4940
Employment (days/yr) 212 164 340 256 247
Wife 144 57 249 194 163
Husband 38 63 60 59 56
Other members 30 44 31 3 28
Household income
(P/annum) 26,642 15,630 45,685 15,803 26,884
Labor productivity
(P/day) 126 95 134 62 109
Return on capital (%) 162 54 210 -96 117
Source: Authors' estimate from IRRIfield survey.
borrowers in this Center should have no difficulty in repaying the loan.
The economic performance of the members in the Masbate Center is
better compared to the respondents under San Pablo and Bay
branches, although the latter are older members of CARD and have
taken more loans (Table 1). This is presumably because of the higher
incidence of poverty and the lack of alternative employment and
income earning opportunities in Masbate compared to San Pablo and
Bay which have well-developed infrastructure facilities and are nearer
to Metro Manila. It will be noted from.Table lOthat for San Pablo, the
share of equity in total capital employed in the enterprise is very low.
The number of days labor used in the enterprise is substantially lower
for both San Pablo and Bay compared to the centers in Masbate and
Milagros.
Table 1 1 reports the estimates of the rate of return for borrowers
classified on the basis of the number of loans taken, The findings
show that in general the financial viability of the enterprises gets
stronger with longer association of. the members with the credit
program. The labor productivity in enterprises run by the new292 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 11. Rate of return on labor and capital:
by number of loans taken by the borrower,
No. of cases 50 49 34
Gross income (P/annum) 13382 38307 60341
Total capital (P) 2138 7508 12691
Equity capital 498 2671 3309
Borrowed capital 1640 4837 9382
CARD loan 1640 4449 10500
Employment (days/yr.) 176 275 366
Wife 127 192 21 9
Husband 28 68 83
Other members 21 15 64
Household income (P/annum) 10837 30855 44764
Labor productivity (P/day) 62 11 2 122
Capital productivity (Percent) -135 11 7 144
Source: Authors' estimates from IRRIfield survey.
borrowers (P62 per day) is, in fact, lower than the wage rate, and the
rate of return on capital is negative when the cost of family labor is
imputed by the market wage rate. The members who have received
'more than two loans have had substantially higher levels of income
and employment from the CARD-financed activity. The rate of return
on capital is 117% for members who have already taken 3 to 4 loans,
and 144% for those with more than 4 loans.
Table 12 reports estimates of the return from investment in
specific activities undertaken with the loan. The most common
activities financed with the credit are trading agricultural produce,
hog raising, retail (sari-sari) store, fish drying and trading, food
vending and fishing. Although hog raising is the most popular activity
undertaken with the credit, the capital used was typically small and
hence the contribution to household income was low, although labor
productivity is substantially high. It is often undertaken as a
secondary activity using only a part of the loan. The low absorptive
capacity of capital in this activity may be due to the problem of
marketing. The trading activities generate very high returns to both
labor and capital and contributes substantially to raising householdHOSSAIN and DIAZ: REACHING THE POOR WITH MICROCREDIT 293
Table 12. Rate of return on labor and capital by activity
": i, '.if!i i'; Nio. '. 'TO_8!' !I :'i :Net., Labor
' _ " ' l ' _ _ : I ' 'C_t_| l , productivity ',"#n:
' :'!"i"_,' .!..... !.¢_se= capital
_'_:; _ ' ; _ (e_ ,:: :/: i:!ira) , (%)
Hog raising 24 3,000 11,040 197 113
Trading
agri'l, produce 25 9,000 43,746 160 260
Sari-sari store 15 6,000 25,238 184 248
Fish drying
and trading 11 8,100 53,468 195 383
Food vending 7 5,400 18,483 128 137
Fishing 5 6000 16,024 88 26
Bakery 3 34000 30,400 83 3
Dressmaking 4 5000 17,000 93 87
Transport 2 10,000 17,528 162 104
Source: Authors' estimates based on IRRIfield survey.
incomes. Fish drying, sari-sari store and trading agricultural produce
generate a net return to capital at more than 250%.
The justification of the Grameen model
The findings presented above amply demonstrates that if the
micro-credit is properly utilized, the financial viability of the enterprise
poses no problem. The challenge is how to ensure proper utilization of
the loan and recovering the credit from the additional income accruing
to the borrowers. The Grameen model of intensive interactions of
bank workers with borrowers and developing group solidarity and
exerting peer pressure through informal organization of the members
are appropriate institutional innovations in this context, The Group
and the Center function as an institution to ensure mutual
accountability. The credibility of the Group and Center as a whole and
future benefits in terms of new loans of a larger size are in jeopardy if
one member breaks the credit discipline, does not properly utilize the
loan and defaults on loan repayments. The individual is kept in line by
a considerable amount of pressure from other members of the294 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
organization. The existence of a well functioning organization thus
acts as the collateral for the bank loan.
The recovery of the loan is facilitated by another institutional
innovation of the Grameen, the procedure of collecting the
repayments in large numbers of small regular installments. In a poor
household there is always a compulsion of utilizing whatever
additional income is generated to satisfy the unmet basic needs. It is
difficult for such hcuseholds to accumulate savings for repaying the
loan at large-size installments. The key to ensuring almost 100%
recovery of loans lies in collecting repayments in weekly installments.
Finally, we should not undermine the importance the Grameen
model attaches to appropriate training and orientation of both
prospective borrower and bank worker for the successful
implementation of the micro-credit program. The key to the success
of the Grameen model is the orientation, approach and human
qualities inculcated in bank workers through a training program based
largely on 'learning by doing', that is, through the observation of and
participation in on-going activities. This helps them understand the
philosophy and approach of the Grameen model of empowering poor
women through access to credit, developing qualities required for
inspiring trust and confidence in the target group, and deriving
satisfaction in serving the community. The bank worker in turn
motivates the target group, earns their confidence through hard work
devoted to their service, and convinces them of the need to follow
credit discipline. The intensive training before conducting bank
business with borrowers contributes to achieving this objective.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
In the absence of comparable benchmark data, the effect of the
micro-credit provided by CARD on the economy of the borrower
household has been estimated by classifying the respondents
according to the number of loans taken and comparing the means of
the criterion variables for old and new borrowers. The null hypothesis
of 'no difference' in the values of the variables for different groups
has been tested by 't'-statistics of the equality of the arithmetic mean
of the criterion variable, using the SPSS statistical package. The
hypothesis will be rejected if the micro-credit leads to improvement in
economic conditions of the borrowing households.HOSSAIN and DIAZ= REACHING THE POOR WITH MICROCREDIT 295
Capital accumulation
The most direct effect of the micro-credit is on accumulation of
capital, both working and fixed. As the loan is repaid in small
installments every week, it is easy for a borrower to pay the
installment from the income leaving the capital intact. A member is
expected to have a larger amount of capital when taking a repeat loan
than at the time of becoming a member. Table 4 shows that CARD
provides a repeat loan in substantially larger amounts. Thus, it is
possible for the borrower to divert some credit or incremental income
for making medium and long-term investments, such as purchase of
cattle or acquisition of machinery, tools and equipment, The
accumulation of these assets will contribute to increasing productivity
of enterprises other than those financed with the CARD loan.
The findings of the borrower survey on investment in CARD
financed activity and accumulation capital in other household
Table 13. Effect of LPDF operations on investment and fixed assets.
NO. of loBns,taken Difference iPOSO)
,\
Items Up to 3to4 ' 4& 3 to4 5&mOte
two ' more over over
two & less two, & less
Investment in CARD
financed activity:
Own capital 498 2671 3309 2173 * 2811 **
( 1.81 ) (3.27)
Borrowed capital 1640 4837 9382 3197 ** 7742 **
(6.14) ( 6.31 )
Value of livestock 7945 9526 10409 1581 2464
holding ( 0.65 ) ( 0.70 )
Value of machinery, 943 7796 14682 6853 ** 13793 **
tools and equipment ( 2.10 ) ( 3.03 )
Value of housing 30,250 32,562 57,863 2,312 27,613"*
( 0.22 ) ( 2.09 )
Note:Figureswithin parenthesesare estimated't' valuesof the difference inmeans.
• * denotes that the hypotheses of equality of means is rejected at 5% error and
•, at 10%.
Source:IRRIfieldsurvey.296 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
enterprises can be seen from Table 13. Since the borrower gets larger
amount with every repeat loan, the borrowed capital was higher for
Iongtime borrowers compared to the newer ones. But more
significantly, the contribution from own sources was also
substantially higher for the older borrowers. The value of livestock
holding and the accumulation of capital in machinery, tools equipment
went up substantially as the number of loans taken from CARD
increased. The difference is found highly statistically significant,
except for the value of livestock holding. The investment for
improvement in housing did not increase much with larger loans for
borrowers who contracted up to four loans. However, Iongtime
borrowers are inclined to invest substantially higher amount for
housing improvements.
Employment generation
The main objective of the micro-credit program is to create
employment opportunities for a vast underutilized labor resource by
undertaking economic activities on a self- employed basis. Any
evaluation of the micro-credit program should thus quantify its impact
on employment generation. However, as mentioned earlier, the effect
of CARD loans on generating new employment is difficult to quantify
accurately without conducting a Costly and time-consuming regular
employment survey throughout the year for the CARD members and a
comparable control group. Instead, we asked respondents in the
borrower survey to report for each family worker the number of
months employed during the year, the number of days employed in a
month and the number of hours employed in a day, for both credit
financed and other economic activities. From this somewhat
imprecise information it is possible to estimate standard eight-hour
days of employment for different members of the household. Table
14 compares this information for respondents classified by the
number of loans taken for the CARD member (the wife) and the
spouse (the husband). The figures show a large increase in
employment for both wife and the husband in the credit financed
activity and the difference is found statistically significant. The
increase in employment for the wife in other economic activities was
only marginal, and statistically insignificant. For the husband the
employment effect was in fact negative, it seems that in poor
households the husband is forced to overwork in low-productiveHOSSAIN and DIAZ: REACHING THE POOR WITH MICROCREDIT 297
Table 14. The effect of LDPF operations on employment of the member
and the spouse, 1997
Difference (No.: of _ay)
_'_ _0 ,i'3 4 ,s& 3to4 , 51
i:,_:,:'; ,tWO , more over _m_r_i
" .... ' ' ' 'I tWO & less
LDPF activity (days/yr)
Wife 117 184 201 67 ** 84 **
(2.01) (2.20)
Husband 28 67 81 39 * 53 **
(1.77 (2,16)
Other activities (days/yr)
Wife 98 135 138 37 40
(1.25 (1.23)
Husband 308 316 245 8 -63 *
(0.28 (1.89)
Notes; Employment is measured in standard eight-hour working days.
Many respondentsreportedworking morethan eight hoursperday.
Figureswithin parenthesesare estimated 't' values.
• * denotesthat the hythotheses of equality of means rejected at
5% probabilityerror,and *, at 10%.
Source:IRRIfieldsurvey.
activities under the pressure to earn a subsistence income. With
additional income earned by the wife from the credit financed
activity, he can afford to enjoy some lelsure. This is the classic
example of the backward bending supply curve of labor mentioned in
economics literature.
The positive effect of higher employment and capital accumulated
would obviously be reflected in higher incomes. The annual income
from loan financed activity was 1.9 times higher for households who
already contracted three to four loans, and 3.5 times higher for older
borrowers compared to new borrowers (Table 15). There was also a
significant increase in income from other economic activities with the
increase in the number of loans.
To analyze the impact of micro-credit on income, we also fitted a
multiple regression model on determinants of income and included
loan taken from CARD as one of the explanatory variables. The298 • - •JOURNAL OF PHII_IPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 15, The effect of LPDF operations on members" income,. 1997
Annual income . ..
from loanfinanced 13,332 38,308 60_314 .187 ** 352 **
activity (P). (3.44) (4.61)
Annual income _ 51,118 77,257 108,229 51 * 112 *
from other _
activity (P) (1.74) (3.45)
Total •-
annual income (P) 64,450 115,565 159,953 79 ** 148 **
(:3.17 ) (4; 83 )
• Note: Figureswithin parenthesesare estimated't' valuesof the.differenccs in means.
• *denotes that the hypothesisof equality ofmeans is rejected at5% probability
error, and * denotesat lessthan I0%.
Source:IRRIfieldsurvey.
Table 16.-The effect of LPDF loan on income: regression estimates.
,H -= , , ,, , , ,_ , ,,,' , , , , ! '':'/" ', ....
,, i i ' ,....
:,:,Vad_blesl, ' .... :,, , '" ','" ", ,*t'i,valu_ !
Members' labor 86.6 4.06 **
• Spouse's labor 58.1 1.83 *
Other members' labor 0.1 0.02
Own capital 2.39 4.26 **
• .Borrowed Capital 3.03 4.1 6 **
Education of membe{ -810 -0.67
Education of spouse 725 .0.55
Age of the member 125 " . . 0.37
Constant term -5772 -0.29
R square 0,61
F-value 20.9
Note: The dependent variable isannual income from the CARD financed activity.
• * denotes that the regression coefficient is statistically signJficant,at 5% error,
and* at i0%,
Source: IRRIfield survey.HOSSAIN and DIAZ: REACHINGTHE Poor WITH MICROCREDIT 2.99
findings •are presented in Table 16. Nearly 61%. of the variation in
income from the credit financed activity.among the respondents is
explained bythe investment of owned and borrowed capital, and
labor provided by the CARD member and the spouse. Thevalue of the
regression coefficients indicate that the marginal productivity of labor
in.the credit financed activity was P87 per day for the CAR D member
and P87 for the spouse. The level of education had a positive effect
on income only for the spouse, •but the. impact is not statistically
significant. The older members earned higher incomes (the effect of
experience) but the association is not statistically significant.
The. positive impact of credit on income, is shown by the
statistically significant regression coefficient of borrowed capital. The
value• of the coefficient suggest that .one peso of CARD. loan
generates a gross income of P3.03, that is, a rate of return of more
than 200%. The results of the econometric analysis • confirms• the
conclusion that the micro-credit provided by CARD has had a positive
impact on the income of borrowing •households.
SUSTAINABILITY OF THE INSTITUTION.
The distinguishing characteristics of the Grameen. model of credit
delivery is.that it takes banking services to the .doorsteps of the
clientele for both disbursement of loans and collection of repayments.
The paper work and the staff time needed for servicing a given
amount of loan are higher for Gramee.n .compared to a normal rural
credit.program. The sustainability of the credit institution therefore
depends on recovering the cost of administration and services from
the borrowers. This section will evaluate how CARD has been coping
with this problem.
Sources. and utilization of fund
CARD has been looking for relatively low-cost loan funds which
has remained a major constraint to the expansion of the credit•
program (Table 17). In October 1990 it received from the Department
of Agrarian Reforms a Soft loan amounting to P262,500 to be •repaid
in quarterly installments over a period of seven years. • The loan was
free of interest. The amount was meagre in relation to the needs.•
•CARD also mobilized a number Of low-cost credit facility with a rate300 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
of interest varying from 6 to 8%, using the windOw of the micro-
credit for the bottom poor under the Land Bank of the Philippines and
the Livelihood Program Fund of the Catholic Relief Services. Again,
the amount was a meagre P3.37 million. In 1993, the Grameen Trust
of Bangladesh provided another soft loan of P3.81 million which
carries a rate of interest of 2% and a repayment period of 10 years.
These funds were inadequate in relation to CARD's capacity to lend.
CARD experienced a high drop-out rate (53%) in 1995 because of its
failureto serve the prospective borrowers, due to lack of Ioanable
funds. The constraint was eased in December 1995 when CARD
decided to tap a high-cost revolving loan fund from the People's
Credit and Finance Corporation. An amount of P20.5 million was
available from this window but it carried a rate of interest of 12% to
be repaid in quarterly installments. The experience suggests that the
supply of fund will remain rationed if Grameen replicators want to
depend on low-cost sources, which would constrain their capacity for
expansion.
Table 17. Sourcesand costs offunds, up to March 1997.
i Amount received Outstanding Rate of
: : ('000 Pes(_) balance interest
" , !, :',
,,,! ,, : ' ,: ! ,
Source of fund ! i Am't, ,,I% share Ain't. % share (% per yr.)
Departmentof
AgrarianReform 262.5 0.8 37.5 0.2 0.0
Catholic
reliefservices 1147.8 3.5 697.8 3.4 6.0
DTi/Dev't. Bank 2000.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 12.0
LandBankof the Phils. 2200.0 6.6 911.8 4.5 8.0
People'sCredit and 20459.5 a 61.5 11460.4 56.5 12.0
FinanceCorp. 3241.5 b 9.7 3241.5 16.0 3.0
Oxfam America 255.0 0.8 255.0 1.3 10.0
GrameenTrust 3709.2 11.1 3678.3 18.1 2.0
Total 33275.5 20282.3 100.0 8.3
a. Revolving creditline(available sinceDecember, 1995)
b. Softloanforadministration ofprogram.
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Table18. Trendsin the utilizationof funds (thousandpeso), 1994 to 1996.
.... ,', ''. _i_I.'!1995 1996, Up to Match 1997
" ' ',,I,'_ ',"'_'"";',_'_' '" '_,i" _,-,.; . ,, "_, ' • ',.,' _ ,
Cash balance 1920 1908 6720 9983
Loansand advances 7721 13069 19360 26757
(51.8) (61.6) (59.0) (60.5)
Admin.fee receivable 1146 1735 2063 2466
(7.7) (8.2) (6.3) (5.6)
Fixedassets& inventory 3932 4461 4610 5046
Others 189 39 63 213
Totalassets 14908 21212 32816 44252
Note:Figures withinparentheses arepercentages oftotalassets,
Source: Financial Reports ofCARD,
Table 17 provided information on the sources of funds mobilized
by CARD so far and their costs. Nearly 62% of the funds are from the
high cost source. The average cost of the Ioanable fund was 6.3%.
Table 16 shows the trend in the utilization of fund. Total assets
reached P44.3 million by March 1997. It has grown at a rate of 62%
per year since 1994. The amount of income earning assets is
indicated by loans and advances, which amounts to about 60% of the
total assets. Interests receivable from the borrowers remained at a
low level of about 6% of total assets and has declined over time
because of the success of CARD in recovering in due time not only the
principal but also the interest charged on the loans. As noted earlier
CARD was able to recover 86% of the interest due on the loan.
Cost of administration
Total operating expenses of CARD increased from $z5.8 million in
1994 to P10.4 million in 1996. As a ratio of total assets, the expenses
declined from 39% in 1994 to 32% in 1996. The decline in cost isthe
result of improvement in operation efficiency over time. The number
of active borrower per bank worker increased from 148 in 1994 to
179 by March 1997, and the amount of loans and savings per bank
worker increased from P327,000 to P800,O00 during this period.
For 1996, the detailed structure of the cost of administering loan
operations in 1996 can be seen from Table 19. The personnel cost302 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
account for 61% of the total cost and the cost of loan fund, 8.5%.
The Grameen model emphasizes heavily on training of prospective
borrowers and bank workers. CARD was able to keep the cost of this
human resource development activity at a relatively low level of about
5.3% of the total cost. The cost on this account is however expected
to go up with the expansion of the program.
Table 19. The cost structurefor LDPF operation,1996.
COSTS as percentof
Costs Current ,OutSTanding Loan
items (O00,P)' assets, loan disbursed
Personnelcost 6331 22.5 32.9 17.6
Training 555 2.0 2.9 1,6
Maintenance,rent &
depreciationof capital items 807 2.9 4.2 2.2
Transport,travel & supplies 694 2.5 3.6 1,9
Other administrativeexpenses 1119 4.0 5.8 3.1
Cost of fund 888 3.1 4.6 2.5
Totalexpenses 10394 36,9 54.0 28.9
Source: Estimated fromCARDFinancial Reports.
Because CARD's activity centers around the mobilization of the
poor and the administration of loans to them, the cost of its operation
should be related to the amount of loans and advances rather than to
total funds (assets) handled by CARD. This information is also shown
in Table 19. In 1996, personnel cost accounted for 17.6% of the
amount of loans disbursed, and the total cost 28.9%. Since CARD
charges 24% administrative fee (20% interest on loans and 4%
service fee) at a flat rate on the amount of loans disbursed it incurs a
financial loss of 17% on the loan operation.
The effective rate of interest to the borrower is the interest
charged per unit of outstanding loans, as this is the amount available
to supplement the capital employed in the enterprise. Personnel cost
accounted for 33% of the amount of outstanding loan, and total cost
54% against the 46% rate of interest earned on this performing
asset. It should be noted here that the cost of funds amounts to onlyHOSSAIN and DIAZ: REACHINGTHE POORWITH MICROCREDIT 303
4.6% of the outstanding loan. For judging economic viability we need
to estimate the opportunity cost of the loan fund rather than actual
cost which includes grants and concessionary funds (Yaron 1992). If
CARD has borrowed the entire Ioanable fund from the high cost
source, this cost would rise to 12%. At this cost of loan fund, the
operating expenses would increase to 61.4% of the amount of
outstanding loan, and the loss on account of loan operation would
increase to 25% of total expenses.
Financial viability of the branches
It should however be recognized that during the expansion phase
of the credit program new branches would be opened every year.
These branches will take time to reach full operation but have a fixed
start-up cost. For older branches, the cost of operation may be lower,
as these branches should be able to expand their business without
adding much to the total cost. Branch level cost function estimated
for Grameen Bank branches in Bangladesh suggested existence of
economies of scale in the operation of the credit program (Khandaker,
Khalilli and Khan 1995).
In order to see the extent to which CARD branches reap
economies of scale with age, detailed information on the amount of
business and the structure of cost for the eight branches under
operation till the end of 1996 is provided in Table 20. Four old
branches - San Pablo, Bay, Dolores and Marinduque have reached an
average business size of about t23.03 million of outstanding loans. At
this size of business, personnel cost comes to 18.1% of the amount
of outstanding loan, cost of fund 8.6%, and other expenses 6.2%. If
all branches operated at this level, the overhead cost on account of
the head office would come down to 12.3%. The total cost of loan
operation thus would be about 45.2%, almost equal to 46% rate of
interest earned on the amount of outstanding loan. The loss that
CARD incurs is thus on account of branches which are yet to mature.
As mentioned earlier the cost' of operation would increase further
if CARD had borrowed all of the loan funds from the People's Credit
and Finance Corporation at 12% rate of interest. To cover this cost, a
branch needs to expand its business (outstanding loan) to P3.5
million, and will have to lend P6.5 million to reach that level. Our
perceived characteristics of such a viable branch is shown in Table
21. A viable branch should have at least 30 centers and 900 activeTable 20. The cost structure of LDF operation at the branch level, 1996. £o O
¢,
_::l_anch : ._- r_eivaldo .cost . _fund . expenses. P_so_ Cost of fund " Others Total
Old branches 3030 548 262 187 18.1 8.6 6.2 32.9
San Pablo 2971 494 239 146 16.6 8.0 4.9 29.6
Dolores 3141 540 278 152 17.2 8.9 4.9 30.9
Bay 2903 524 272 213 18.1 9.4 7.3 34.8
Marind uque 3104 634 259 238 20.4 8.3 7,7 36,4
New branches 1765 608 186 271 33.8 10.4 15.t 59.3
Palanas 1999 578 136 160 28.9 6.8 8.0 43.7 c.
Masbate 2543 708 266 415 28.9 10.8 16.9 56,6 o c
Mi[agros 1320 530 122 177 40.2 9.2 13.4 62,8 z
Mind oro 1317 617 218 331 46.8 16.6 25,1 88,5
o
"11
AJl branches 19324 4625 1790 1835 23.9 9.3 9.5 42.7 -o I
m
"O
Head Office 19421 1654 - 1344 8.5 6.9 15.4 "o
z
Note: Figureswithin parentheses areHead Officecostat the levelof businessfor viablebranches, m







z306 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
regular weekly installments so that the repayment does not put
pressure on low-income households; developing collective funds with
compulsory savings from borrowers for their mutual benefit to cope
with financial crisis and saving them from the clutches of usurious
moneylenders at times of emergency; and promoting social
development of members using credit as an entry point. The
modification has been in the area of training of borrowers and bank
workers, and in the management and utilization of the collective fund
that suit the unique lifestyle and economic conditions among low -
income Filipinos.
By March 1997, CARD has mobilized through 13 branches over
7000 members and disbursed P82.3 million of which 76% has already
been recovered. The amount of outstanding loans with borrowers has
reached P-20 million, and savings in the members' collective funds at
P11 million. A survey of 133 borrowers selected from four branches,
conducted for this evaluation, shows that CARD has largely
succeeded in reaching low-income households with credit. Nearly
70% of its borrowers have no access to land and have very poor
housing worth less than P25,000, and they received a share of loans
proportional to their numbers. Only.13% of the CARD borrowers have
college level education, and 9% have landholding of over one hectare.
The average size of a loan taken by a borrower was P9,500 of which
P4,940 was financial loan used for running enterprises on a self-
employed basis. The most common enterprises are trading
agricultural produce, hog-raising, retail stores, fishing, fish drying and
trading, and food vending.
The average labor productivity in enterprises financed with the
loan was P107 per day, 34% higher than the market wage rate of P80
per day. The rate of return on capital was 117% compared to 46%
rate interest charged by CARD on the amount of outstanding loan.
These enterprises add P2240 per month to household income, which
comprise 25% of the total income of the borrowing households.
Employment, income and labor productivity increases with the
number of repeat loans taken from CARD.
Inspire of the high rate of interest charged on the loan CARD has
not yet been able to cover its operating expenses, because of the high
cost of operation of this intensively supervised credit program. In
1996, the cost of administration was 29% of the amount of loans
disbursed, and 54% of the amount of outstanding loans with the
borrowers, which led the institution to incur a financial loss of 17% ofHOSSAIN and DIAZ: REACHINGTHE POORWITH MICROCREDIT 307
total expenses. It is however found that a branch that reaches a
business size of P3.0 million of outstanding loan can recover its cost
from the interest earned. It takes four to five years for a branch to
achieve financial viability.
It is natural for any Grameen replication to incur losses during the
period of expansion and consolidation, due to the high start=up cost of
opening new branches and the four to five years it takes to reach the
break-even level. CARD has so far covered the loss by mobilizing a
small amount of grants from sympathetic donors and drawing on
available low-cost sources of fund. But it is a key constraint to the
expansion of its operation.
Since the microcredit has been effective in improving the
livelihood of the low-income households, the government should
mobilize adequate donor support on behalf of the replicators to reduce
the cost of loan funds, so they could minimize financial losses. The
microcredit institutions should encourage borrowers to undertake
small-scale production activities through subcontracting arrange-
ments with large-scale business enterprises which could benefit from
the low-opportunity cost of labor for borrower households. This would
help increase absorptive capacity of capital and reduce the time
needed by branches to achieve financial viability. The government
should not control the rate of interest charged by replicators in
microcredit operations. Without a high rate of interest microcredit
operators would not be able to expand operations on a scale large
enough to have a significant impact on poverty alleviation.308 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
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